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Traces of Resurrection: The Pattern of Simone Weil’s Mysticism 
In her “Letter to a priest”, Simone Weil makes the following, typically bold, assertion concerning 
belief in the resurrection: “Hitler could die and return to life again fifty times, but I should still not 
look upon him as the Son of God. And if the gospel omitted all mention of Christ’s resurrection, faith 
would be easier for me. The Cross by itself suffices me.”1 This statement as has often served as an 
indication that Weil’s version of Christian mysticism has no place for the resurrection.  Throughout 
the collection of short essays, articles and notebooks produced at the end of her life Weil reflects 
frequently, in profound and intriguing ways, on the significance of death, its effect on human thought 
and its place in moral and spiritual life. Not only is death “the source of all untruth and of all truth for 
men”2, the crucifixion of Christ becomes the centre not only of her spirituality, but also of her 
metaphysics; creation, for Weil, is the cross that crucifies God.
3
 In some of the more extreme 
formulations scattered through the notebooks, in particular, Weil gives that impression that she sees 
life as a cosmic mistake that it is the task of spiritual life to rectify, through acceptance of death: 
“[b]irth involves us in the original sin, death redeems us from it.”4 Death is the humiliating destiny of 
all finite creatures, but if one can refuse the various compulsive ways there are of evading the thought 
of this, and consent to, or even love this necessity, one thereby participates in the process of 
“decreation”, the eradication of the autonomous self. All this adds to the sense that the deepest 
structures of Weil’s thought support the terse statement above: hers is a mysticism of death, not 
resurrection.  
In what follows I examine the basic shape, or pattern, of Weil’s understanding of mystical 
insight and/or transformation. I then proceed to explore the theological significance of certain 
conceptual tensions that appear within this understanding, tensions which relate closely to her 
ambivalence toward the idea of resurrection. 
Losing and Saving One’s Life. 
A particularly notable entry from Simone Weil’s Marseilles notebook states that real spiritual 
awakening is like death: “[o]ne must place one’s life in something one cannot touch on any account. It 
is impossible. It is a death. It means no longer being alive. And that is exactly what is wanted.”5 
Before examining Weil’s work in detail, then, I would like to introduce a set of conceptual issues 
through examination of one of the most important sayings attributed to Jesus of Nazareth:“[t]hose 
who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake will save it”.6 In an 
analogous way, this saying suggests that death may be less opposed to life than one might expect. The 
saying warns that when it comes to the ultimate “saving” of life, all is not as it seems: loss can be 
gain, and the desire to gain may lead to loss.  At first glance, the saying appears to announce a 
dramatic reversal of perspective, and by doing so, to put the human capacity to evaluate, and to act 
based on such evaluation, into question.  
Upon closer examination, however, an important aspect of the saying complicates the picture 
somewhat; the desire for life. As we will see, Weil tends to see the determinative factor in human life 
as being the desire for the good, and is interested primarily in how this desire can be redeemed from 
its distorted forms, and rarely talks about the idea of desiring one’s “life” as an energy to be 
transformed or harnessed.  The gospel saying rests on the assumption that although one may not know 
exactly what it is that one desires when one desires “one’s life”, one is right, nonetheless, to desire it. 
The verse that immediately follows in Mark’s version makes this clear: “For what will it profit them 
to gain the whole world and forfeit their life? Indeed, what can they give in return for their life?”  
Life’s value is such that it cannot be measured by any comparison, or be the subject of any exchange. 
And indeed, it is the concern for one’s life that would cause one to listen to such wisdom, for if one 
did not much care either way whether one “gained” or “saved” one’s life, then neither the warning nor 
the promise would be of any interest.  It is because one wants to live—even if one is not entirely clear 
on what one wants when one wants to live—that at the saying grabs one’s attention.  However, the 
desire or pursuit that the immeasurable value of one’s life inspires is ambiguous, and subject to 
warning and scrutiny; the question it, seems, is not of whether to desire one’s life, but of how.  As we 
will see, in analogous way, for Weil it is not a case of whether one desires the good, but of how; at 
what “level” one places, or conceives of, this good. 
If the saying is unintelligible apart from the assumed desire to “save” one’s life, one may well 
wonder whether an overly philosophical interpretation may miss the eschatological dimension of 
these words: alongside the appearance of a principle concerning evaluation (that things are not as they 
seem; that to seek to secure possession of “one’s life” is to lose it; that apparent loss is really gain) is 
something much more like a promise: those who lose their lives “for my sake” will gain it; that is, 
they will in fact attain that which they desired. It is in hope of actually gaining one’s life, not simply 
of learning to see or value it differently, that the disciple is prepared to choose to lose their life.  Two 
obvious ways of understanding this text present themselves, on one hand, eschatologically, as an 
expression of a promise; on the other handy, more rationally or philosophically, as an articulation of a 
principle.   
An important question also arises here concerning the distinction between saving and losing 
one’s life, and, presumably then, the difference between living and dying. The whole force of the 
saying depends on the distinction between loss and gain, losing and saving, and yet at the same time, 
in all these cases, these distinctions seem close to dissolving. It seems as though this instability is 
crucial to the transformative potential of these ideas: one may turn out to have been fundamentally 
mistaken not just about what it means to die, but about what one’s “life” really was. As we will see, 
many of the most interesting of Weil’s reflections on mystical experience depend on the distinction 
between emptiness and fullness, hunger and satiety, life and death, whilst at the same time seeming to 
suggest a fundamental upheaval of these distinctions. 
This issue can also be discerned in the “beatitudes”. Each beatitude follows the same pattern, 
with a group defined by a characteristic linked to state that is announced as “blessing”. However, the 
relationship between the present condition and the “blessedness” that corresponds to it can be 
construed in a number of different ways.  Perhaps most obviously, some of these sayings seem to 
affirm that despite their condition the poor in spirit, the meek, the grieving, or the persecuted are, or 
will be, blessed.  The blessing that is the coming of the kingdom does not respect the distinctions that 
usually distinguish the fortunate from the unfortunate, just as the sun shines on the just and the unjust.  
And so blessedness may be absent—or hidden—at present but it is nevertheless still obvious – it 
consists in receiving the kingdom of heaven, in inheriting the earth, in being comforted. One does not 
have to be told why one is blessed in inheriting the earth, or in being comforted; such things are a 
blessing, and there is nothing counter-intuitive about the nature of the blessing, only the in the divine 
choice of recipient.   
However, another logic also suggests itself through some of the sayings.  The merciful will 
receive mercy, surely, because of the mercy they have showed; the pure in heart will see God because 
that was what they desired above all else; those that hunger for justice or righteousness are rewarded 
according to their hunger.  These sayings, then, may announce a completion in which the full 
significance of present actions or attitudes is fully developed and recognized; the peacemakers are 
finally named as the children of God they always were.  In the former case, the difference between 
hardship and reward is relatively stable; in the latter case, slightly less so: perhaps certain kinds of 
hunger are already a blessing, however well-disguised.  Finally, and perhaps most problematically, the 
first and last of the beatitudes end with “for theirs is the kingdom of heaven”, suggesting, perhaps that 
the kingdom of heaven is already present in poverty of spirit and persecution, and that the values of 
the kingdom are plainly and simply opposed to earthly values.   
But then, if poverty of spirit and persecution can be manifestations of the kingdom (persecution 
in particular, is described as being a sign of one’s inheritance of the kingdom, the mark of an 
authentic prophet), what is it that makes inheritance of this kingdom a blessing, rather than a curse?  If 
the persecuted are receiving the kingdom of heaven in and through their persecutions, why should one 
desire this kingdom at all?
7
 In other words, there is also the hint here that what is announced is an 
inversion of ordinary human valuation. But proclaiming an inversion of human values, affirming that 
wealth is poverty, weakness is strength, and suffering, joy, is far from straightforward.  If it is to be 
the case that poverty can manifest a kind of wealth, what is it that makes this poverty wealth, if not 
wealth? Speech rebels against the attempt to simply invert values, because articulating such an 
inversion requires an affirmation: if all values are overturned on what basis does one affirm anything - 
what is it that one is doing when one affirms?
8
  If the blessings of the kingdom appear as 
paradoxically opposed to all usual notions of blessing, why should one count them as blessings at all?  
 The beatitudes seem, then, to suggest all three of these dynamics (and probably more), and in 
each of them the values of the kingdom are at a different distance from, and in a different kind of 
relationship to, mundane valuation, and distinctions that such valuation perceives. In the same way, in 
the saying about the losing and saving of life, there is the hint of a dramatic subversion, inversion or 
reversal of perspective, but at the same time, there is no wholesale rejection of one’s natural desire for 
life. My suggestion, here, is that the particular power that these sayings possess rely on this 
ambiguity. It could be that one finds out that in the kingdom of heaven, true value is almost the 
reverse of what one expected, such that one finds one was not only looking in the wrong place, but 
looking for the wrong thing in the first place (as Paul seems to suggest at the beginning of his first 
letter to the Corinthians). Equally, however, it could be that one discovers how to find the very thing 
one had longed for.  Although I do not have the space to justify the assumption here, I will be 
assuming that this ambiguity, or instability, correlates in some way to the basic shape of the Christian 
narrative: in the resurrection, the crucified Christ is re-presented, and the cross is given meaning. But 
because the meaning of this death is only given, presented, or recovered through its undoing, there is 
no simple presentation whatever it is that is demonstrated, achieved or exemplified by the cross.  The 
resurrection presents and transforms, or transforms as it presents: this leaves a tremendous ambiguity 
as to how we can see meaning in death, or indeed, see meaning in a particular approach to death as a 
way of living.  If the death of Jesus can be said to bring life, we are left with the question of what, in 
this case, we mean by “death”, just as, if it is the crucified Jesus who is raised to life, we are left with 
the question of what, in this case, is meant by “life”.   
In what follows I will try to follow similar conceptual contours as they appear in a number of 
important passages from Simone Weil’s religious writings, especially those that attempt to articulate 
moments of mystical upheaval, and which are concerned with the transformative potential of an 
encounter with the thought of death, emptiness or “void”. 
Death, Imbalance and the Void 
One can see in Weil’s work the conviction that one’s orientation towards one’s death is somehow 
determinative of one’s whole being. The acceptance of death is linked with a traumatic reorientation 
of the whole of one’s life, which is described in a number of different ways, with different images and 
metaphors, although we will only have space to examine two of these fairly briefly. 
Firstly, Weil’s understanding of the operation of human desire, thought and action is often 
expressed in terms of compensation, balance and the search for equilibrium. For example, one might 
hope for an expression of praise or thanks that seemed proportional to the energy one imagines 
oneself to have expended in a particular task, or revenge in proportion to the indignity one imagines 
one has suffered, and so on.
9
 Weil often links this search for balance with the idea that suffering of 
various kinds can be thought of as a loss of energy; we are prepared to lose energy for the sake of 
some future gain, but the thought of a loss of energy without compensation is intolerable. Weil sees 
this tendency as the source of all manner of deception, as the search for equilibrium is “bad because 
imaginary”; we are left perpetually striving after an equilibrium that never comes because it is 
impossible.
10
  Because one continually sees the world through the lens of the desired equilibrium, one 
never pays attention to things as they are, but “cloaks” them with the thought of the satisfaction, 
restitution, compensation or reward they are imagined to promise us.
11
 However, Weil thinks that this 
tendency is deeply rooted in life itself, insofar as each living thing acts as an inside that appropriates 
what lies outside it for its own purposes, for its own future.
12
  It follows, then that to contemplate 
things as they are, “unshrouded by some imagined future” is to see things as though one were dead; 
“[o]ne has to be dead to be able to see things in their nakedness”.13  
In one sense, then, to refuse to seek compensations or balance—whether this is through the act 
of forgiveness, through accepting a lack of recognition or reward, or through honestly attending to the 
reality of some present suffering—is also to accept death, as she notes memorably on one occasion: 
“[t]o forgive debts. To accept the past without asking for future compensation. To stop time at the 
present instant. This is also the acceptance of death.”14 Conversely, the dynamic that she describes as 
“the search for equilibrium” is itself the manifestation of the denial of death.  There is a sense in 
which death is the ultimate sign of imbalance, for it marks the point beyond which no counter-
balance, repayment or compensation is possible, and marks out our lives as essentially unbalanced 
and unfinished.  To accept death is to accept that one’s vital energy is essentially limited, and that one 
is destined to lose all of it.  As a result, the thought of death itself calls for a “counter-weight”; here 
she has in mind the way that the meaning that is sought in life may often be a way of trying to 
produce something that defies, resists or survives death.
15
 The thought of death produces a panicked 
reaction, in which one seeks an opposite to cancel it out, but this reaction in fact prevents life being 
loved as what it is, because all valuations based on the threat of death simply turn life into death’s 
opposite.
16
  In this way, it is only the contemplation and acceptance of death that reveals life in its 
contingent finitude—which is its reality—rather than a mere counterweight to death. This is seen in 
one of the notebook entries that were compiled in the collection Gravity and Grace: 
If we go down into ourselves we ﬁnd that we possess exactly what we desire. If we long for a 
certain being (who is dead), we desire a particular, limited being; therefore, necessarily, a 
mortal, and we long for that special being “who” . . . “to whom” . . ., etc., in short that being 
who died at such and such a time on such and such a day. And we have that being—dead.17 
Here the point is not that this change in perspective removes the pain of loss, but that the pain of loss 
is now the way in which reality is being given to us, insofar as it is the result of the limited 
particularity which was part and parcel of their very being. 
To summarise, then, the refusal of compensatory psychological mechanisms involves a kind of 
death, insofar as it means to see the world in its own reality, free of the distortion produced by the 
drive to continue in one’s own existence. On the other hand, it is death itself which produces this 
compulsive form of life; death is both poison and cure, a pharmakon. 
Using a slightly different set of concepts and related images, Weil makes a very similar point in 
terms of the attempt to “fill the void”.  “Void” is experienced primarily in terms of the impossibility 
of desire, and the meaninglessness of suffering.
18
 One of Weil’s deepest convictions seems to have 
been that the experience of being human in the world was essentially the experience of an insatiable 
desire for something inaccessible, or the experience of an absence - the absence of any final good 
“here below”.19 The desire for the good is not so much something one has, as something one is,20 and 
yet this desire is for something inaccessible and absent.
21
 To accept this is to accept that the hungry 
core of one’s being is destined to remain unsatisfied, and that nothing that one can obtain, or even aim 
at, reduces this tension. This means that there is a kind of impotence and emptiness at the heart of 
one’s own being, and to accept this means to surrender one’s capacity for self-determination. In a 
sense, then, the experience of “void” is integral to being human at all; it is the result of being finite 
creatures that contain, or in sense are, a desire for a transcendent, inaccessible good.
22
 The “void” is 
the “immeasurable gulf” between the transcendent good that we desire, and the finite world, 
dominated by “necessity”, which is our home.23 As a result, she is deeply suspicious of religious 
notions—for example, various doctrines concerning life “after” death—that can function so as to 
allow the needy ego to evade the contradiction of its own existence, because the saving truth lies in 
this contradiction. Without the acceptance of this “immeasurable gulf”, one has no real sense of what 
the good is; in in Weil’s terms, one conceives good at the wrong “level”.  Any idea or doctrine that 
encourages one to do this is deeply suspect. One of the more memorable remarks in Gravity and 
Grace reads: 
We must leave on one side the beliefs which fill up voids and sweeten what is bitter. The belief 
in immortality. The belief in the utility of sin: etiam peccata. The belief in the providential 
ordering of events – in short, the “consolations” which are ordinarily sought in religion.24 
Put more positively, the point, for Weil, is not to arrive at a fixed set of conceptions of life, death and 
purpose, but rather try to find a way of using concepts as opportunities for a certain kind of 
contemplation and encounter with reality.
25
  One can contemplate the truth of atheism and the truth of 
theism in different ways, because each may involve a genuine challenge to the settled beliefs that in 
different ways cushion one from real contact with the world.
26
  For Weil, contradictions can be 
experienced and contemplated in such a way that one is “drawn upwards”, but it is not so much the 
internal content of any particular contradiction that represents its value, but rather the nature of our 
confrontation with it - the “resistance” it offers to us (see the quotation from “Forms of the Implicit 
Love of God” below for more on “resistance”). 27  Hence the significance of the acceptance of death: 
we are finite mortals oriented towards the eternal; this is the experienced “impossibility” of our 
existence.  By contemplating this, we experience the impossibility of desire, and in the process one 
may be fundamentally de-centred, or made to “look up and wait”.28   
The Pattern of Mystical Transformation 
The question of what happens when one has “looked up, and waited” will be considered next, through 
a reading of Weil’s reflections on the nature of spiritual transformation. As we will see, I believe that 
some of the questions that emerge from these reflections are very similar to those that were raised in 
relation to the gospel sayings above.  
In her luminous short essay “Some Reflections on the Love of God” Weil articulates the heart 
of her understanding of spiritual awakening in terms of an acceptance of death: 
It is not for man to seek, or even to believe in, God. He has only to refuse his love to everything 
which is not God. This refusal does not presuppose any belief. It is enough to recognise, what is 
obvious to any mind, that all the goods of this world, past, present and future, real or imaginary, 
are finite and limited and radically incapable of satisfying the desire which burns perpetually 
within us for an infinite and perfect good. All men know this, and more than once in their lives 
they recognise it for moment, but then they immediately begin deceiving themselves again so 
as not to know it any longer, because they feel that if they knew it they could not go on living. 
And their feeling is true, for that knowledge kills, but it inflicts a death which leads to a 
resurrection. But they do not forsee that beforehand; all they forsee is death; they must either 
choose truth and death or falsehood and life.
29
 
It is noteworthy that although at this juncture Weil refers to a Platonic imperative—to “turn away with 
your whole soul from the things that pass”—she frames her allegiance to this imperative in Christian 
terms: death leads to resurrection, not immortality.  Despite this, however, her discomfort with 
“resurrection” is very apparent, and as soon as she introduces this term, she immediately qualifies it: 
“they do not foresee that beforehand; all they foresee is death”. This qualification has to do with 
perspective; there is a difference between the “choice” she describes as it really is, and the choice as it 
is perceived by “all men” (sic).  The “resurrection” that is spoken of here cannot be foreseen as 
resurrection, it can only be foreseen as death, and hence it is death that one must learn to accept; there 
is a strange sense in which spiritual life means learning to prefer death to life. However, this 
disciplining of one’s desire is not sufficient, and Weil goes on to say that spiritual “advance” is not 
gained through activity, but through patient, receptive waiting: 
A little child who suddenly perceives that he has lost his mother in the street runs about, crying, 
in all directions; but he is wrong. If he had the sense and courage to stay where he is and wait, 
she would find him sooner. We must only wait and call out. Not call upon someone, while we 
still do not know if there is anyone; but cry out that we are hungry and want bread. Whether we 
cry for a short time or a long time, in the end we shall be fed, and then we shall not believe but 
we shall know that there really is bread. What surer proof could one ask for than to have eaten 
it? But before one has eaten, it is neither needful nor particularly useful to believe in bread. 
What is essential is to know that one is hungry; and this is not belief, it is absolutely certain 
knowledge which can only be obscured by lies. All those who believe that food exists, or will 
one day be produced in this world, are lying. 
So we can now see that there may be a deeper reason for Weil’s reluctance to concern herself with the 
idea of resurrection; not only is the idea dangerously close to a crude and sensationalist 
supernaturalism, it may also be an unhelpful diversion of attention. In Weil’s terms, it is easy to 
imagine various kinds of bread, but immensely difficult to face up to spiritual/metaphysical hunger, 
and so religious ideas that encourage the imagination to anticipate fulfilment in particular forms may 
be dangerous distractions, all too willingly embraced. More than this, however, Weil explores the idea 
that when it comes to the desire for the good, desire is its own satisfaction: when all the desire in the 
soul has been detached from earthly goods, “on that day I shall possess the sovereign good . . . 
desiring in itself will be my good”).30 This realisation, in fact, is part of what the spiritual 
transformation that she is concerned with consists in.
31
 
However, what Weil does not seem to take note of here is that although it may not be 
particularly “useful” to believe in bread before one has eaten, at the same time we might say that 
“hunger” is inescapably intentional; it is hard to make sense of what it would even mean to know that 
one is hungry without some implicit conception of satiety.  At the very least, it would be hard to see 
how the metaphor could do much work here if the distinction between the state of being hungry and 
the state of being satisfied was to be lost altogether, just as the synoptic saying relies on the desire for 
life, and the real difference between losing and saving it.
32
 And so it seems as though the metaphor 
she uses—which, with all its gospel resonances carries much of the force of the thought here—pulls in 
a different direction to some of the intellectual tendencies evident elsewhere.
33
   
The logic of the first extract from “Some Reflections on the Love of God” is repeated at several 
key passages in her notebooks, most notably in the Marseilles notebook: 
“The world is a closed door. It is a barrier, and at the same time it is the passage way.  
If we want only the absolute good, that is to say, if we reject all the existing or possible, 
sensible, imaginary or conceivable good that is offered us by creatures as being insufficient; if 
we prefer to choose nothing at all rather than all that, then (with time), being turned toward that 
which we cannot possibly conceive, a revelation of it comes to us – the revelation that this 
nothingness is really the fullest possible fullness, the main-spring and principle of all reality. 
Then we can truthfully say that we have faith in God.”34 
In both cases the movement involves a painful acceptance, or endurance, but there is a small but 
important conceptual difference concerning the positive moment. This can be seen in comparison 
between the crucial phrases in each: in the essay, we read that there is a knowledge that kills, but that 
it “inflicts a death which leads to a resurrection”; in the notebooks we read that if we reject all 
conceivable goods, and wait, then a revelation comes, “the revelation that this nothingness is really 
the fullest possible fullness.” The difference seems to be between transformation, in which that which 
has died is resurrected in a transformed state (through the provision of ‘supernatural bread”), and a 
dramatic and liberating shift in perspective (in which nothingness is shown to have been—all along, 
presumably—fullness).   
The beginning of “Some Reflections on the Love of God” can be seen as an exhortation for 
honesty concerning the difference between desire and fulfilment, or between hunger and satiety. The 
path to spiritual transformation is, according to Weil, remarkably simple: to admit the insatiable 
nature of the desire that “burns perpetually within”, and then to “wait”. Somehow, the honesty 
required to admit to this hunger, and the patience required to “wait” is rarer than one might expect 
(and here the fourth beatitude is clearly in the background).  But the logic of the extract from the 
notebooks above is to suggest that there is a perspective from which the difference between hunger 
and satiety disappears, insofar as “void” is shown to have been “the fullest possible fullness”. Weil 
seems overwhelmingly to favour the latter approach in her thought (in which the mystical moment is a 
shift in perspective, which dissolves certain distinctions), but my suggestion here is that there are 
good reasons to pay attention to the “traces” of the former (in which there is transformation, and the 
difference between hunger and bread is maintained). 
A similar issue can be discerned in an entry that concerns time. For Weil, “time”, like death, is 
both a sign of our finitude, and the root of sinful attempts to escape from our condition; this is most 
often explored in relation to periods of intense suffering, in which the passage of time is felt as an 
inescapable curse.  For Weil, when the time of suffering is accepted and loved as time, it opens out 
onto “eternity”, just as death accepted as death leads to life: “[i]f one behaves as though dead, the 
Lord comes and brings life from on high. ... Total obedience to time obliges God to bestow 
eternity.”35 There is a strange dynamic here: abundance is glimpsed, or given, only once scarcity is 
accepted.  But, again, it is not clear whether Weil has in mind something like an unveiling or dramatic 
shift in perspective, in which time is found to be eternity, just as emptiness was found to be fullness; 
or something more like a transformation, in which eternity overcomes the finitude of time.  Forms of 
understanding based on either could be accused of “sweetening what is bitter” or providing false 
consolation: if one believes that one can, somehow, become reconciled with death and temporal 
finitude through a shift in perspective, one may thereby sweeten the bitterness; if one believes that 
suffering is a temporary trial and that heavenly relief awaits in a God-given future, one might never 
taste the bitterness in the first place.  Weil’s tendency to resolve the ambiguity in the direction of the 
former raises the suspicion that at times her own thought a tendency of resolving contradictions too 
hastily, rather than “waiting” with them. 
In an excellent essay on Weil concept of "decreation", J. P. Little briefly suggests a criticism of 
Weil that, in my view deserves greater attention, and which I hope will shed some light on the issues 
we are concerned with here. As has already been mentioned, for Weil, creation is seen as an act of 
abdication, in which God consents to be less than everything; and in this sense, ‘decreation’ is the 
process by which, through acceptance of our essential nullity, autonomous creatures imitate this 
abdication, by ‘refusing to be’.36 Little goes on to explore the role of this concept in Weil’s thought, 
with particular reference to her dualistic conception of the self, which consists of the autonomous ego 
that says “I” and the “uncreated”, eternal core. In passing she notes that there is a parallel between the 
metaphysics that Weil develops and her own judgement of the “desire for equilibrium”: “Our human 
response to God, decreation replying to creation, amounts to an almost necessary reciprocity, a 
symmetry indicative of Simone Weil’s need in this, as in many other areas of her thought, to restore a 
balance that has been disturbed by the assertion of the autonomous self.”37 The possibility is raised, 
then, that Weil may have provided the conceptual tools necessary to critique some of her own more 
extreme metaphysical speculations.  
In my view, it seems as though the ambiguity between the two ways of understanding the 
mystical moments in Weil’s thought—perspective and transformation—may actually be a fertile 
ambiguity, but very often Weil seems to resolve the ambiguity in one direction, as already discussed. 
In some respects it seems as though the effect of this is to restore a certain kind of balance: the truth of 
desire is that it is its own aim; the truth of our finitude and death is that this is our fulfilment; the truth 
of the loved one’s absence is their presence; the truth of our existence is its essential nullity. In short, 
all that seems to negate being, vitality or relationality becomes a “draught of immortality” once faced 
and accepted.
38
 But perhaps the effect of this is actually is to reduce the sense that to be human is to 
be essentially unfinished, and open. The gospel saying with which we began appears to maintain the 
sense that the “gain” of one’s life may lie ahead, even as it also suggests a complete upheaval of the 
difference between gain and loss. Weil’s work, it appears to me, is often animated by a similar 
tension, and yet Weil’s tendency is to tip the balance in favour of a mystical transformation of 
perspective, which can be rationally comprehended. Little suggest that Weil’s own metaphysics may 
be tainted by the search for equilibrium; my argument here is that at times she is guilty of resolving 
some of the most fertile ambiguities that her work expresses slightly too quickly, in search of purity. 
Conclusion 
The notebooks, short essays and letters that contain this rich legacy are complicated and unfinished, 
and moreover, Weil herself is not unaware of some of the conflicts and tensions that emerge from 
them, and did not intend to provide a final schematic account of them. Nevertheless, the set of ideas 
with which I have been concerned appear frequently enough to be considered a central part of her 
thought, and one of her key concerns: to articulate the essential shape or pattern of mystical 
revaluation. In the brief discussion above, I have tried to show that there is a conceptual conflict 
apparent in the important passages that describe this pattern. Weil seems to have experimented with 
her own way of resolving this issue, and others like it through two ideas: firstly, that some beliefs 
should be held “in secret” and are self-refuting as soon as they are known or held consciously 
(because loss is not really loss if it known to really be gain);
39
 secondly, the idea that there are 
different “levels” of affirmation, meaning that some truths can be false if conceived at the wrong 
“level”. 40 These ideas are deeply intriguing and profound in their own right. My suggestion is simply 
that the ambiguity may have been more important and more fundamental to Christian thought, than 
Weil realised, and that this may have something to do with the meaning of the resurrection; a subject 
that she devoted relatively little attention to, and seems to have dismissed rather too easily. A rare 
reflection from Weil’s “New York Notebook” that gestures in the direction I have in mind will have 
to serve as a final word: 
The resurrection is Christ’s pardon to those who killed him, the evidence that in doing him the 
greatest possible harm they did him no harm. [. . .] The joy of Easter is not the joy that comes 
after pain, like freedom after chains, repletion after hunger, or reunion after separation. It is the 
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